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conomic situations. Capacity underutilization follows from microeconomic uncertainty at 
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capacity utilization and markups via the effect of capacity utilization rate changes on 
firms' market power. We show that such a relationship infiuences significantly the short 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of the determinants of factor utilization and markup rate variations is cur­

rently at the heart of several research programs in macroeconomics. It is now recognized
 
that factor utilizati9n and markup rate variations may playa crucial role in explaining
 
business cycle fiuctuations, either by contributing to generate endogenous fiuctuations 1
 
or by complexifying the economic mechanisms that propagate through the economy the
 
effects of exogenous shocks. The literature on propagation mechanisms has usually dis­

cussed the effects of factor utilization and of markup rate changes separately. Factor
 
utilization variability have received much attention in purely competitiv~ real business
 
cyc1e models as a mechanism which magnifies the effect of exogenous productivity shocks
 
on the economy2. Several papers in the New-Keynesian literature have instead empha­

sized the effects of markup rate variations (especially counter-cyc1ical variations) as an
 
important mechanism accouting for the propagation of exogenous demand shocks inside
 
business cyc1e models with imperfect competition3 . We emphasize in this paper the re­

lationship between the two phenomena (factor utilization and markups) via the effect
 
of capacity utilization rate changes on firms'market power in an imperfectly competitive
 
economy. \Ve show that such a relationship infiuences significantly the short run response
 
of the economy to exogenous shocks.
 
The paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to provide an acceptable descrip­

tion of the microeconomics of capacity underutilization (such as heterogeneous utilization
 
rates). In most existing intertemporal models with variable factor utilization, the cap­

ital utilization rate variable is introduced in the firm's intertemporal decision problem
 
via its impact on capital depreciation4 • The optimal capital utilization rate is such that
 
ISee for instance the model developed in d'Aspremont, Dos Santos, Gerard-Varet (1994), where the
 
variability of markup rates leads to the possibility of endogenous business cycles. Gali (1994) shO\ys that
 
self-fulfilling prophecies (sunspot ftuctuations) are possible in presence of variable markups. In de la
 
Croix and Licandro (1994), factor underutilization may be a source of endogenous ftuctuations.
 
2Furthermore, when there are underutilization phenomena, the Solow residual can no longer be viewed 
as a measure of exogenous technological shocks. On labour hoarding, see e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo, (1993)). On capacity utilization, see e.g. Greenwood, Hercovitz and Huffman (1988), Burnside 
and Eichenbaum (1994), Cooley, Hansen and Prescott (1994), Licandro and Puch (1995). 
3See a.o. Rotemberg-Woodford (1991), (1992) and (1993), Portier (1995). 
~Strict1y speaking, those models do not really formalize the idea of capacity underutilization: there is 
simply a variation in the intensity of capital utilization. This issue is also raised by Cooley, Hansen and 
Prescott (1994) who focus instead on the concept of capacity idleness in way closer to ours. 
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the marginal revenue induced by a more intensive use is offset by the marginal cost of 
faster capital depreciation. Although there may be such a link between capital utilization 
intensity and physical depreciation, \Ve believe that it is unlikely to be the main driving 
force behind actual capacity utilization rate fluctuations, as reported in business surveys. 
For this reason, we propose a different representation, wherein capacity underutilization 
follows from microeconomic demand uncertainty and sluggish capacity adjustments. The 
model allows for microeconomic heterogeneity and implies an aggregate capacity utiliza-
tion rate smaller than unity. 
Our second objective is to stress the relationship between capacity utilization and market 
power in an imperfectly competitive goods market. In an imperfectly competitive setup, 
capacity constraints introduce a distinction between demand and sales price elasticities 
and for this reason infiuences optimal markup values. Capacity constraints therefore 
affect theyropagation mechanism of exogenous disturbances in two ways. The first effect 
is similar to the effect that bottlenecks and stockouts have in a perfectly competitive 
setup; the second effect is related to imperfect competition and worh through market 
power and optimal markup changes. 
Constructing a model with such features in an intertemporal setup raises sorne difficulties. 
As we want a model where the diversity of situations across firms (and thus the hetero-
geneity of micro utilization rates) is recognized, we need explicit aggregation procedures 
which are unavoidably cumbersome. ?\Ioreover, modelling capacity constraints in an im-
perfect competition framework may become very complicated if the strategic dimension 
of the game played by firms is fully taken into account5. It is of course impossible to 
tackle all these issues at once within a full-fiedged stochastic model. For this reason, 
\Ve construct a non-stochastic6 model without important strategic dimensiono vVe thus 
assume, as the macroeconomic literature usually does, an infinite number (a continuum) 
of imperfectly competitive firms. Our primary objective is to build a very simple model 
which remains sufficiently tractable to permit later developments or extensions. Our for-
mulation is based on earlier work on macroeconomic models with capacity constraints 
and imperfectly competitive price setting (see Sneessens (1987), and subsequent works by 
a.o. Licandro (1995), de la Croix and Fagnart (1995)). 
5See for example Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). 
6~lore precisely, there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model. There are however idiosynchratic 
stochastic shocks. 
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The key elements of our stylized intertemporal model can be briefly summarized as fol-
lows. The economy consists of a final and intermediate goods sector7 • The firms in the 
intermediate goods sector are monopolistica11y competitive and must decide on the size 
of their productive capacity under uncertainty regarding the market demand for their 
output. In the (competitive) final good sector, independent technology shocks cause each 
intermediate good to have different marginal productivity. The demand for each interme-
diate good is thus different. This structure implies that the production of intermediate 
goods firm may be demand- or capacity-determined in function of the actual demand 
conditions. Accordingly, output levels, capacity utilization and markup rates thus differ 
across firms in function of these demand conditions. The average markup rate in the 
economy is positively linked to the average capacity utilization rateo 
The paper is organized as fo11ows. Section 2 is devoted _to the description of individual 
behaviours. Section 3 characterizes the general equilibrium of this economy and analyzes 
the properties of its stationary state. Section 4 illustrates the dynamic properties of the 
model with two numerical examples which illustrate the interactions between capacity uti-
lization and markup rates and their implications on the behaviour of other macroeconomic 
variables. 
2. Behaviours 
2.1 Product firms 
The homogeneous final good is produced by a representative product firmo It is sold on 
a competitive market and can be used either as a consumption or an investment good. 
There is no fixed input, which implies that the optimization program of the representative 
firm remains purely static. 
The production technology is represented by a constant return to scale CES production 
function defined over a continuum of variable inputs, each one denoted by y and indexed 
by j, with j belonging to the interval [0,1]. More forma11y, the representative product 
firm's output (denoted Y) is obtained from the fo11owing production function: 
with () > 1 (1) 
7Such a structure has been extensively used in the literature. See for instance Romer (1987), Farmer 
(1994), Gali and Zilibotti (1995). 
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Each productivity parameter vf ~ ois drawn from an LLd. stochastic process with unit 
mean and distribution function F(v). 
Taking the final output price Pt and the prices of the different inputs {p/}j as given, the 
profit maximization of the firm at t can then be written as: 
1 
IJ:lax, [ Pt yt - 1 pI yf dj]
{yf}j,lt o 
subject to the technological constraint (1) where the parameters {vnj are known. 
As the production technology displays constant returns-to-scale, the competitive firm 
always makes zero profits at the prevailing prices andis willing to produce any output 
level }í ~ O. 
For a given output level yt, the optimal demand of each input j (Le., the cost minimizing 
demand for j) is given by 
j j \.1 J'(PI) -O}'
Yt = 'P t Vt, v (2) 
t 
where the price index 'Pt of the inputs is defined as 
(3) 
The assumptions of perfect competition and constant-returns-to scale then imply Pt = 'Pt • 
For notational convenience, let mbe the relative price of input j with respect to the price 
of the final good: pI pIm- P 'P ' t t 
In the sequel, we use the final good as numeraire so that Pt == 'Pt 1 for t = 1,2, .... 
2.2 Input firms 
Each input j is produced by a single firm (henceforth input firm). In order to obtain a 
simple concept of productive capacity, we assume that the production of each interme-
diate good combines labour and capital through a Leontief technology. The input firm's 
production capacity is predetermined and equal8 to the capital stock the firm installed in 
8This assumption on the production technology allows us to build a very simple benchmark in which, 
at given capital stock, any fluctuation of output is only made possible by a variation of the capacity 
utilization rateo For notational convenience, we normalize capital productivity to 1. 
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period t - 1 (kt - 1). Labour is supposed to be a purely variable input. It is bought on a 
competitive market and can be adjusted instantaneously to its optimallevel. For a given 
production level q{, the latter is given by 
e1 - q{ (4) 
where at represents the productivity of labour. 
"Ve assume that the capacity choice of firm j for time period t is made in t - 1 and thus 
made under uncertainty regarding demand conditions (in particular, the realized values 
of the stochastic terms {v{}j are still unknown). "Ve examine successively the short run 
(Le., at given productive capacity) optimization behaviour and the investment decision of 
the firmo 
Short run decisions: Assuming that the price and output decisions take place after the 
realization of the idiosynchratic shocks {v{}j, the short run (real) profit maximization 
can be written as follows 
. Wt) . 
max ( PI - - qf {~,qn at 
subject to the demand constraint (2) and the capacity constraint q{ < ki-l' 
Firm j takes the wage level Wt, the final output level yt and all the other prices as given. 
It is obvious that firm j has always interest to eliminate any excess demand for its output 
by a rise in its price so that ql = y¡' Associating the Lagrangean multiplier >.1 ('2 O) to 
the capacity constraint, the solution of the profit maximization is described as follows: 
• Either >.1 = O(the capacity constraint is not binding); firm j then adopts the pricing 
rule P{t which is given by a constant markup over the unit labour costs: 
. () Wt 
P'It = -()1- (5) 
- at 
and 
(6) 
• Or >.1 > O(the pricing rule P{t implies a demand level for j larger than the productive 
capacity); firm j then adopts the pricing rule ~t which sets demand for j at the 
level of the productive capacity, Le., 
(7) 
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implying that 
. _ [ kl ]-1/9 ~t - --o (8)yt vI 
At given capacity, the latter pricing rule ~t(> P{t) is increasing in yt v{ 
Let vI represent thé critical value of the demand parameter such that the demand for 
input j at price P{t is equal to the production capacity of supplier j, Le., 
. { = O if 
>'i 
> O if 
It can be easily be shown that vI is defined by 
_j kL1 
t 'V j. 
V - (P{t) -9 yt' 
For later use, it is also worth noting that the ratio of ~t and P{t can be expressed as a 
function of the ratio between the observed value of vI and the critical value vI: from (9), 
one can indeed write that 
. [vI] 1/9 . (10)~t = vI PIt 
The investment decision of firm j can then be represented by the following problem9: 
max E 'f Rt { (p{ ql Wt qf) - i{ } 
{inl t=l at 
subject to kl = (1 - ó) kl-1 + i{, 'V t 2:: 1, kb given 
t 
with R t = II(l + T sr 1, 'V t 2:: 1 
s=l 
The variable Ts is the real interest rate10 at time period s and ó is the depreciation rate 
of capital. 
Before the realization of vI, expected sales in tare given byll 
v1
E(qf) = E min{y!,qf} = E(y!) r v dF(v) + kL1 r~ dF(v) (11)Jo Ji?¡ 
9The investment goods are purchased in the final goods market. Their real price is thus equal to one. 
IOIt may be worth repeating that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy so that the sequence 
of real interest rates can be perfectly anticipated. 
IIThe expression E(Xt ) denotes the expected value of the variable X t before observing the value oC the 
parameter vf. 
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where E(yf) = (P{t) -9 ~ 
Similarly, the expected revenue associated to these sales is given by 
E(P{ qf) = P{t E(y{) (vi v dF(v) + kLl (>O ~t dF(v) (12) 
_ Jo Ju¡ 
Qne shows easily that the optimality condition for the capital stock to be installed in each 
period t = 1,2, o" is given by 12 
100 () - 1·' Wt+l 001rt+l + Ó = . -()- llzt+l dF(v) - - . dF(v) (13) U¡+1 at+ 1 U¡+1 
The latter optimality condition imposes that investment in every period be such that the 
marginal operating surplus expected from an additional unit of capital (right-hand side) 
be equal to the user cost of cap~tal (left-hand side). The expected marginal operating 
surplus is equal to the profit margin per unjt of output 13 corrected by the probability of 
utilizing this extra unit of capital. 
2.3 Consumer 
In order to close the model, we consider an infinitely lived consumer whose intertemporal 
preferences with respect to consumption and labour are represented by a time separable 
utility function. The optimal time profiles of consumptions {Ctht=l, ... ,oo} and labour 
supplies {Ld{t=l, ... ,oo} are given by the solution of the following problem: 
max L00 f3t U (Ct, Lt) {Ct,L¡} t=l 
subject to the wealth constraints 
At = At- 1 (1 + rt) + Wt Lt + ITt - Ct - T,., V t ~ 1, with Ao given. (14) 
The U function is strictly increasing in Ct (Uc > O), decreasing in L t (UL < O), twice 
differentiable and strictly concave. The parameter f3 is a constant subjective discount rateo 
12~Ioreover, the discounted value oC the capital stock which is available at t must tend to zero when t 
tends to infinity. 
13 A marginal unit oC capital allows the firm to serve sorne extra demand when the capacity is binding 
but imposes a marginal reduction in prices (see the definition oC ~ in (8)): the corresponding extra 
revenue per unit oC output is given by (1 - l/O) ~o The marginal operating surplus per unit oC output is 
then given by the latter term minus the unit labour costo 
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At is the real financial wealth at t. IT t represents the monopolistic firms real profits. Since 
there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy, the sequence of equilibrium profits, 
wages and rates of return {Wt, rtl{t==l, ... ,oo} is perfectly foreseen by the consumero The 
sequence of lump-sum taxes {7t}{t==l,... ,oo} (financing the government spending) is taken 
as given by the consumer. 
Optimal consumption demand and labour supply profiles satisfy the following first-order 
conditions at any time t 2: 1 
Uc(Ct , L t ) - UC(Ct+1, Lt+1) f3 (1 + rt+l) (15) 
Wt Uc(Ct , Lt ) -UL(Ct , L t ). (16) 
Moreover, the consumption and labour supply profiles must satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the agent. This is equivalent to saying that 
which must be satisfied with strict equality if there is no satiation. 
The interpretation of the standard conditions (15) and (16) is fairly straightforward. 
3. General Equilibrium 
3.1 Equilibrium and Aggregation in the Inputs Sector 
At the time they make their capacity choice, all the input firms j have the same infor-
mation about their individual demand and face exactly the same uncertainty. Assuming 
that aH firms have the same initial capital stock (k~ = ka, V j), they will choose the same 
capital stock in each period: 
As aH firms then have the same productive capacity, the critical value for the demand 
parameter vI is the same for aH (and Ilrt = Plt): 
Vj E [0,1], 
-
k
yt 
t 
Plt 
8 (17) 
However, as different input firms experience different demand shocks, individual optimal 
8 
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price and output decisions differ across firms: 
j < -if V t _ VI, then Pl =Plt and qf. = y{ :s kt- l 
(18){ j -if Vt > Vt, then Pl = ~t and qf. = kt- l 
where ~t is given by (8) and y{ is given by (2). 
F(Vt) represents the proportion of firms that have idle capacities (Le., those for which 
v{ E [O, Vt]); 1-F(Vt) is the proportion of firms at ful1 capacity. 
From (18) and the definition of the aggregate price index (see (3)), we obtain after nor-
malization the fol1owing relationship between Plt and P2t: 
1 = laDe p~¡1J V dF(v) + fv~ p~¡1J v dF(v) (19) 
Alternatively, by using (10), 
. [¡ne roo (V) l/O ] 11~1 
Plt = lo v dF(v) + Vt lDe Vt dF(v) :s 1 (20) 
Since, for each firm, P2t is larger than Plt, it is obvious that that Plt is always smal1er than 
1. In the extreme case where no capacity constraint is binding (i.e., Vt -+ 00), equation 
(20) gives the standard result that Plt = 1 in an equilibrium that becomes symmetric in 
prices. At the other extreme, when Üt is equal to zero (no idle capacities left), equation 
(19) then serves to determine the full capacity output (see equation (23) below). 
Given the employment level in each firm, aggregate employment, denoted LI! is given by: 
(21) 
3.2 Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Given the features of an equilibrium in the inputs market, a dynamic general equilibrium 
of the economy is a sequence of prices {{p!}j, Wt, Tt} t and a sequence of quantity variables 
{{q{,enj,kt,Ct,Lt}t such that at each time period t = 1,2, ... 
• {p!}j and {qf.,enj satisfy (18) and (4) for all j 
• the labour market (characterized by equations (16) for supply and (21) for demand) 
clears. 
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• the final output level is given by 
(22) 
where the optimal consumption level is derived from equation (2) and the optimal 
capital stock is given by (13), with ka given. 
3.3 Capacity utilization and markups 
Let }~* be the full capacity final output in the economy. Since productive capacities are 
predetermined, }~* is simply given by (see (1)) 
where 80 = foOO vIlO dF(v) (23) 
80 represents an aggregation constant. 
Let Dt be the capacity utilization rate at the_ aggregate economy level: 
}í 
D t = }~* 
where Dt is strictly smaller than 1 as long as there remain idle capacities in sorne firms, 
i.e., as long as F(vd remains different14 from O. The instantaneous correlation between 
output and capacity utilization is necessarily positive. In other words, the aggregate 
capacity utilization rate depends negatively on Vil i.e., on the proportion of firms the 
output of which is demand determined. As the latter firms have a lower markup rate, 
there exists an increasing relationship between the capacity utilization rate D t and the 
average markup rate across firms. Indeed, a decrease in Vil say .:.\ Vil means that f(Vt) 6. Vt 
extra firms are now at full capacity and switch from the pricing rule PI to the pricing rule 
P2' At given price elasticity of demand, this implies an increasing relationship between 
capacity utilization and average markup rateo Analytically, dividing the input price index 
(see (19)) by unit labour costs (wt/at) allows us to compute the average markup rate ¡tt 
over marginal costs: () 1 
¡tt = () _ 1 PIt' 
HStrictly speaking, full capacity utilization occurs when Vt = O. Howe\"er, as we outline in the sequel, 
the economy may be de facto in an equilibrium with full utilization even though Vt :f:. O. If the variance 
of the idiosynchratic shocks is small enough, a strictly positive value of tit may indeed be consistent with 
the fact that the proportion of firms with idle capacities F(Vt) is not different from zero. If Vt was exactly 
equal to zero, the general equilibrium would still be characterized by the same set of equations as before 
except that equation (19) would then coUapse into (23), the labour demand then being equal to kt-I/at. 
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Given (20), J-lt is a decreasing function of Vh bounded below by ()/(() - 1). When no 
capacity constraint is binding, Plt is equal to 1 and J-lt is the standard function of the 
(here constant) price elasticity of demando The larger the number of firms at full capacity 
(i.e., the more Plt departs from its upper bound 1), the higher the average markup rate 
in the economy. 
3.4 Stationary State Equilibrium 
At the stationary state, < ah 1t, Gt >=< a, T, G > and each endogenous variable remains 
constant. Equation (15) then determines the stationary interest rate as a function of the 
subjective time discount rate: 1-,a 
r = -,a-o (24) 
Provided that v is strictly positive, we know (see 20) that the relative price Pl can be 
written as a monotonic function of 'Ü, Le., suppressing the time index t, 
[ r (Xl (V)l/O -]9~1 Pl = Jo v dF(v) + v Jjj il dF(v) (25) 
where Pl goes to 1 (resp. O) when ü goes to 00 (resp. O). 
From the optimal investment rule (13) and after suppressing the time indices and replacing 
the relative price P2 and the real unit labour cost w/a by their expressions in terms of 
Pl (see equations (10) and (5)), we obtain another monotonically increasing relationship 
between Pl and v which holds for any strictly positive value of v: 
() [(XJ (V) l/O [':lO]-l
Pl = (r + 8) () _ 1 Jjj il dF(v) - Jjj dF(v) (26) 
",here Pl tends to 00 (resp. O) when v tends to 00 (resp. O). 
The stationary state equilibrium values of v and pare determined by the intersection of 
(25) and (26). Given the monotoniticy of the two relationships and their behaviour at 
the two limit values of v, a sufficient condition for the existence of such an intersection at 
a strictly positive value of v is that the slope of (25) be strictly larger than the slope of 
11 
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(26) when v tends to zero. Qne can show that this wiII be the case iflS 
8-1 
So > [(r + 8) (} ~ 1] -9 (27) 
If (27) is not satisfi_ed, the stationary state equilibrium is then characterized by the full 
utilization of production capacities and v =O. Equation (25) then collapses into Y = Y* 
(see (23)), whereas the analytical manipulations which lead to (26) now determine the 
stationary level of real wages. 
The stationary values of aH the other variables can next be determined. Because of the 
constaut returns to scale assumption, the stationary state values of the variables v, Pl, W 
will not depend on the consumer's intratemporal preferences U which only infiuence the 
stationary levels of output, employment, consumption and capital stock. 
3.5 Implications for short run dynamics 
"Ve propose hereafter a diagrammatical representation of the labour market equilibrium 
at given capital stock and at the stationary state. In the two panels of figure 1, the 
upward-sloping curve represents a standard labour supply curve as implied by equation 
(16). The other curve (sloping downwards in figure l.a, horizontal in figure l.b) rep~esents 
the macroeconomic labour demand cun'e given by equation (21) (combined with equations 
(17) and (20)). From the previous section, the stationary state wage level is known to 
be independent of the employment level, so that the long-term labour demand curve 
is horizontal (figure l.b). In the ver)' short run, Le, at given capital stock, the labour 
demand curve is sloping downwards and intersects the two axes. It necessarily intersects 
the horizontal axis because, even at zero wage, the short run demand for labour is bounded 
above by the number of available job slots corresponding to the full employment of the 
installed capacities (Le., from equation (21) in that case, L t = kt-l/ad. Given the labour 
demand equation, the employment level is linked positively to the capacity utilization 
rateo In other words, Vt varies along a short run labour demand schedule so that the 
aggregate capacity utilization rate and the average markup also vary. A downwards shift 
15For instance, if {vi}} are lognormally distributed, 89 is bounded aboye by 1 and the condition should 
be satisfied for plausible values of r and 6, unless (J is so close to 1 that the right-hand-side of (27) is 
larger than 1. For example, if r + ais equal to 0.2 (what is unrealiscaIly high on a quaterly basis), (27) 
is satisfied if (J ~ 1.45 when 0'; =0.75, if (J ~ 1.3 when 0'; =0.2. It goes without saying that for lower 
(and more realistic) values oC r + 6, (27) remains satisfied Cor lower values of (J. 
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along this curve corresponds to an increase in the proportion of firms that produce at full 
capacity and therefore to an increase in the markup rateo When L is small (in particular 
when it goes to zero), all firms underutilise their production capacity and Plt = 1. The 
feasible real wage (as implied by (17)) is then equal to (1 - l/e) a. It should be noticed 
Figure 1: Instantaneous and stationary equilibria in the labour market 
1.a At kt- 1 given l.b Steady State 
Wt W 
11-1
-II-a U(C,w) 
PI 11;1 a f---------r.----....,...Ld 
kt-l - L L~ t 
that the labour demand curve may be vertical (Le., have an infinite slope for an interval 
of values of the real wage) at the level of the maximum employment level 16 • As \Ve have 
explained in the previous section, the economy exhibits de jacto full utilisation for all the 
values of Vt such that F(Vt) is null. A do\Vnwards move along the vertical part of the curve 
then implies that markups rise while real wages decrease (at unchanged employment and 
output levels). 
In a simple ,vay, the aboye diagrammatical representation illustrates the interactions 
between capacity utilization and markup variations and the other variables in the short 
runo In particular, it shows clearly why the short run effects of a same perturbation 
depends crucially on the value of the capacity utilisation rate when the perturbation 
occurS. Consider an economy initially at its stationary state as described in figure 1.b. 
A pertubation occurs. Instantaneously, the economy is now characterized by figure l.a. 
Depending on the initial capacity utilization rate, the economy líes in a given point of the 
short run labour demand curve. If it líes in the ftatter part of the curve (low utilization 
rates), firms respond to the perturbation by changing their production plan with líttle 
change in markups and prices. If, to the contrary, the utilization rates are high (steeper 
16In the same way, it should also be pointed out that the labour demand curve is horizontal over an 
interval oC employment levels close to zero. The highest Ceasible wage is indeed reached when al! firms 
have idle capacities. The zero employment level is only the most extreme case oC such a situation. 
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part of the curve), firms will raise their markupsand there will be little output effect in 
the short runo 
4. Transitional Dynamics and Numerical Simulations 
This section has two objectives. The first one is simply to check the local stability of 
the model. \Ve solve this nonlinear model by using a Newton-Raphson relaxation method 
proposed by Laffargue (1990) and further developed by Boucekkine (1995). As Boucekkine 
shows, Laffargue's algorithm is very powerful to check the existence of a unique stable 
saddle-point solution.. Indeed, non saddlepoint models induce an explosive behavior of 
Laffargue's algorithm 17 and are thus ill-conditioned. This algorithm thus allows ones to 
check the existence and the uniqueness of the saddlepoint solution in a very convenient 
way. 
The second objective of the section is to illustrate the interactions between capacity 
utilization and markup rates and the other variables by analysing numerically the dynamic 
behavior of the model in response to various changes in the environment of firms. This 
will allow us to illustrate that a same shock can have quite different short run effects 
depending on the characteristics of the initial steady state (" low" or "high" capacity 
utilization rate). 
\Ve consider two economies which are identical except for the variance cr; of the idyosyn-
chratic shocks {vih. The main difference between the stationary equilibria of these two 
economies is the value of the equilibrium capacity utilisation rate, which is higher the 
lower18 the variance cr;. F(v) is assumed a lognormal distribution function. In the first 
economy (called hereafter the Unitary D economy), we set cr; to 0.00005 so as to produce 
an equilibrium very close to full capacity utilisation. In the second economy (called here-
after the Low D economy), we set cr; to 0.2 implying a capacity utilization rate of about 
86% given the other parameters of the model. 
17This explosive behavior in presence of a non saddlepoint model is induced by a simple numerical 
test which relies on the initialization of the algorithm. Ir the algorithm is initialized with values of 
the endogenous variables which depart sligthly from the stationary state values, an explosive behavior 
appears at the first Newton-Raphson iteration when the simulation horizon tends to infinity (Le., in the 
numerical experiment, when the simulation horizon becomes large). 
18Indeed, the larger O'~, the larger the mismatch between demands and supplies, and consequently the 
lower D t at any productive capacity level. 
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cFor these other parameters, we choose the following calibration. "Ve assume a utility 
function of the eRRA variety like 
l 
-,. L l +T 
U (Ct , L t ) - -1_t- - -1_t- (28)
-"1 +T 
with "1 = 1.2 and T-= 1 and choose the following values for the other parameters of the 
model: a = 1, () = 4 (which implies a mark-up rate of about 40% in the model), {3 = 0.99 
(so that the real interest rate on a quaterly basi~ is about 1%), G = O, 6 =0.0188. 
The values of the most important variables at the stationary state in these two economies 
are given in the following table: 
yF(v) D c 
Unitary D (a; = 0.00005) 0.855 :::::: O :::::: 1 1.387 0.871 0.854 
Low D (a; = 0.2) 0.944 0.531 0.866 1.410 0.862 - 0.843 -
"Ve analyse successively the effects of a temporary and a permanent shock. The tempo-
rary shock increase in governement spendings G. The permanent one represents a labour 
augmenting technical progress (increase in the productivity coefficient a). For the two 
economies (Unitary D and Low D), we report the time profiles of ouput, capacity utiliza-
tion rate, employment, markup rate, consumption and real wage rateo (see figures 2 and 
4). In each of these figures, the vertical axis measures the gap (in %) between the value 
of the variable at time t and its value at the initial stationary state. 
a) Temporary Increase in Government Purchases 
\Ve suppose a temporary increase in G. The initial impulse G l is equal to 1% of the 
stationary level of output and has not been anticipated by the agents. In the following 
periods (t > 1), Gt is given by Gt = 0.95 Gt - l and perfectly anticipated. The purpose of 
this numerical exercice should not be misunderstood. In absence of capacity constraints, 
markups would be constant in our economy. It is therefore obvious that the governement 
spending shock cannot be magnified. The existence of capacity constraints tends to 
dampen it instead. Our point is precisely to show how the initial capacity utilization rate 
infiuences the response of the economy to the shock. 
In figure 1 aboye, an increase in G leaves the labour demand curves unaffected and only 
shifts the labour supply curve to the right (negative wealth effect) implying a downwards 
15 
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move along the short run labour demand curve. An instantaneous (and positive) effect 
on output is only possible in an economy with capacity underutilization, Le., as long as 
the labour demand curve has a finite slope. The instantaneous effect in the unitarv D 
economy (vertical demand curve) is necessarily null. 
As figure 2 shows élearly: the short run effects (up to 5 periods) of the gouvernement 
spending increase are much more expansionary in the Low D economy than in the Unitary 
Done. A difference between the evolution of the markup and real wage rates in the 
two economies is striking: the government spending increase raises very significantly the 
markup rate in the unitary D economy, leading to much more depressed real wages. 
b) Labour Augmenting Technical Progress a. 
\Ve now consider a permanent and deterministic increase of 1% in the productivity of 
labour. 
The long run effects of such a technical progress are clear. It increases the real wage 
by 1% (upwards shift of the stationary state labour demand curve in figure 1), raises the 
stationary levels of output, consumption and capital. The stationary effect on employment 
remains ambiguous and depends on the parameters characterizing the utility function (and 
determining the size of the shift of the labour supply curve to the left). In the short run, 
the increase in the productivity of labour reduces the maximum employment level (less 
workers are now necessary for a given production capacity) but increases the maximum 
wage level. The short run labour demand curve thus moves upwards at low levels of 
employment and inwards near the maximum employment level (see figure 3 below). 
The instantaneous effects of the productivity gain thus depend crucially on whether the 
initial employment level is to the left or to the right of the intersection point between the 
old and the new demand curves, Le., on whether the initial equilibrium capacity utilization 
rate is small (flatter part of the labour demand curve) or large (steeper part of the labour 
demand curve). In the first case, the productivity gain induces an instantaneous rise in 
real wages ",hile the effect on employment remains ambiguous and depends on the labour 
supply behavior. In the second case, the instantaneous effect on employment is negative; 
the size of the employment contraction determines whether the short run real wage falls 
or increases. 
In the two numerical exercices, the long run employment level is lower after the increase 
16 
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Figure 2: Impulse response to a temporary government spending increase 
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Figure 3: Effects of a labour productivity gain 
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in the labour productivity and the employment level falls instantaneously. It even falls 
below its new stationary value in the unitary D economy~ At given capitaJ produetivity, 
the labour productivity gain leads to a short run increase in capacity utilization in the 
low D economy \vhere the employment contraction is consequently less severe. Again, the 
unitary D economy exhibits a stronger variability of markups so that the labour market 
clearing requires much stronger fiuctuations in real wages. i\'1oreover, since most firms in 
the Low D economy are able to easily respond to extra demand for goods, production 
goes to its ne\\' stationary state leyel more quickly than in the lJnitary D economy. 
5. Conclusions 
By introducing microeconomic demand uncertainty in a a dynamic intertemporal setup 
with imperfect competition, we have developped a theoretical model wherein capacity 
underutilization -following from demand uncertainty- is a macroeconomic equilibrium 
feature relying on a diversity of microeconomic situations. "Ve have shown that capacity 
utilization and markup rate changes are related via the effect of the former on the firm's 
actual market po\\'er. This relationship between capacity utilization and markups has 
strong implications on the way exogenous stochastic shocks can propagate through the 
economy. The same shock can have quite different effects depending on the characteristics 
of the initial stationary state (lo\\' or high capacity utilization rate). In case of a permanent 
shock, the initial capacity utilization rate also infiuences the time the economy nceds to 
approach its new stationary state. 
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Figure 4: Impulse response to a labor productivity increase 
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\Ve should emphasize in this context that the positive relationship between capacity uti-
lization and markup rates does not imply per se a positive correlation between output and 
markup rates over the cycle. The latter correlation can be positive or negative, and de-
pends on the correlation between productive capacities and output. Moreover, any source 
of variability in the. price elasticity of demand itself is likely to complexify significantly 
the relationship existing between capacity utilization and marketpower. 
The model presented in this paper can be used as a starting point for further developments. 
The next logical step is of course to complete the model with stochastic processes and to 
examine the characteristics of the cyclical fluctuations so generated. We leave this topic 
for future research. 
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